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Summary 
The report summarises the characteristics of successful 
contract farming and outgrower schemes in Sub Saharan 
Africa. It uses secondary data drawn from the literature 
on contract farming and some primary data collected on 
recent missions to Malawi and Zambia. Further fieldwork 
in these countries is proposed. 
In the context of agricultural market liberalisation and 
with the reduction of state responsibility for 
agricultural service provision, contract farming or 
outgrower schemes (the terms are used interchangeably in 
this report) are attracting increasing attention as an 
institutional form for private sector led agricultural 
development in rural Africa. 
A theoretical assessment of the advantages of contract 
farming arrangements over other forms of raw material 
sourcing (spot markets, estate production) suggest that 
where raw materials must reach stringent quality 
criteria, are highly perishable or require labour 
intensive husbandry, contract farming will be 
advantageous. A review of actual experience suggests 
that other factors have played an important role in the 
establishment of successful schemes, or equally, have 
prevented schemes developing. 
Access to markets is one factor. This has two aspects: 
access to the necessary physical infrastructure and 
transport to move production to markets; and sufficient 
financial incentives in the form of profitable market 
opportunities. Another factor is competition: where 
companies face a lot of competition for the purchase of 
products, outgrower schemes can collapse as sales are 
diverted by producers to other buyers. 
In the past governments have played a direct role in 
establishing outgrower schemes, often through state run 
parastatals operating as a single marketing channel for a 
given commodity. Given the much reduced risk of leakage 
under a monopsonistic marketing system, the coincidence 
of state marketing policies and outgrower arrangements is 
not surprising. Many of these schemes were joint 
ventures with donors. 
Government support for outgrower schemes was often framed 
in terms of broad national objectives: integrating the 
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smallholder sector into the commercial economy; opening 
up new parts of the country through settlement schemes; 
increasing export revenues and attracting foreign 
investment into the country without the need to make the 
politically sensitive decision of granting a foreign 
company land rights. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as governments have withdrawn 
from direct involvement in agricultural production and 
marketing, concessionary financing for government 
outgrower schemes with broad developmental objectives is 
disappearing. The role of government has been redefined 
and is to create an enabling environment to encourage 
investment. For their part, private sector investors can 
be expected to prioritise commercial viability over any 
broad developmental objective. However, a successful 
scheme does require the parties involved (the company and 
the producers) to draw mutual benefits, otherwise it will 
collapse. 
Factors internal to the design and operation of the 
scheme which influence a successful outcome are (i) the 
contractual relationship (what services are provided by 
the company and on what terms; what commitments are made 
by the producer in return); (ii) the appropriateness of 
the technology promoted in relation to existing farming 
systems among smallholders and the prevailing patterns of 
labour allocation and resource availability within 
households; (iii) attention to issues of food security; 
(iv) the distribution of risk between the company and 
farmers; and (v) the degree to which farmers can organise 
and bargain collectively with the company to influence 
the distribution of benefits or allocation of managerial 
responsibilities. 
A number of external factors which are not directly under 
the control of the company but which have a key bearing 
on the success of a scheme are prices in international 
markets; the macroeconomic stability of the country; and 
climatic factors. 
In Malawi, contract farming is viewed as a means to 
diversify the agricultural sector and there is 
considerable interest in it as an institutional form. A 
number of crops have been identified as suitable 
candidates for cultivation under an outgrower system and 
this is facilitated by the operation of the existing 
"estates" system. However government could do much to 
4 
·-
improve the enabling environment for private investors. 
With regard to specific efforts to promote outgrower 
schemes in recent years, field research is needed to 
suggest improvements. 
In Zambia, contract farming has been embraced as a 
concept by government, farmers 1 organisations and donors 
both to promote agricultural diversification and to 
improve farmer access to inputs. A number of schemes are 
already operating, particularly in cotton, but more 
recently in paprika, castor bean, tobacco and maize. 
Potential exists for other crops to be developed in this 
way. The major constraints identified were access to 
marketing information among investors and the diversion 
of sales by smallholders. 
Field research is proposed to set up and plan a programme 
of research into recent and ongoing outgrower schemes in 
Malawi and Zambia. This will be used to identify two or 
three key companies prepared to undertake collaborative 
research with NRI on the development of new institutional 
arrangements to promote successful and sustainable 
integration of smallholders into outgrower schemes. 
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Introduction 
This desk review is funded under ODA's Crop Post Harvest 
Programme. The framework for the research is the 
improvement of marketing and financing services for 
traders and farmers in liberalising economies. The Terms 
of Reference required the researcher to identify the 
types of scheme, the commodities and situations for which 
contract farming/outgrower schemes are appropriate as 
well as the critical success factors. 
Economic liberalisation in many African countries, 
combined with the need to service significant national 
debt, has led to an increasing interest among governments 
in promoting agricultural exports, both traditional and 
non traditional alike. At the same time macroeconomic 
reforms have led to a reduction of the resources that the 
state has available for agricultural development, 
limiting its ability to assist directly in the process. 
Given this context, new institutional frameworks are 
needed to replace disappearing state services which can 
provide farmers with the resources to take advantage of 
new opportunities. 
The immediate demand for this research was a request from 
the Managing Director of Press Agriculture Ltd in Malawi. 
The Press Group is the largest company in Malawi and 
employs some 20,000 people on its estates. It remains 
committed to tobacco production but liberalisation in the 
marketing of export crops has made agricultural 
diversification an important objective. Outgrower 
schemes are a favoured institutional option, but the 
company is aware that smallholders generally are rather 
suspicious of such schemes which have been characterised 
in the past by top-down planning, excluding village 
authorities and farmers themselves. For this reason 
Press Agriculture believed it would be worth conducting 
desk and field research in to the success and failure of 
outgrower schemes. 
A visit to Zambia in September/October 1995 confirmed the 
impression that there is considerable regional interest 
in contract farming/outgrower schemes. The Zambia 
National Farmers Union believes that they could play an 
important role in assisting smallholders to diversify 
their production systems and gain access to inputs which 
are no longer available through government financing. 
Donors are taking a similar positive view: the European 
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Union funded Smallholder Development Projects in Kabwe 
(Central Province) and Mpongwe (Copperbelt) are assisting 
in the establishment of schemes. 
From a theoretical perspective, contract farming and 
outgrower schemes are an appealing option. Contract 
farming is understood here to mean a contractual 
arrangement between farmers and a firm, whether oral or 
written, specifying one or more conditions of production 
and marketing of an agricultural product (an outgrower 
scheme is very similar and will be used interchangeably 
in this discussion, although in the past it has sometimes 
to connoted a government scheme, whilst a contract 
farming arrangement is considered to involve only private 
entities) . The contract will commit the grower to 
producing a certain commodity at a certain time for an 
agreed price, and in return the firm markets the 
commodity and may provide extension and other services 
during the production stage. 
The attraction of such arrangements are the mutual 
benefits received by the grower and firm as market inter-
linkage reduces risk and uncertainty for both parties. 
For example where a firm agrees to buy all that is 
produced of a given quality at a pre-determined price, 
the grower is assured of a market. If the firm also 
provides inputs and extension advice, the production risk 
facing the grower is reduced as well. As state marketing 
boards and subsidised agricultural credit disappear in 
many African countries, the potential importance of such 
schemes is clear. 
From the firm's perspective, contract farming is a means 
to capture a regular supply of raw materials into a 
processing or marketing system. If a firm has invested 
heavily in a processing utility or in marketing 
infrastructure it needs to ensure a level of throughput 
approaching maximum capacity in order to offset 
investment costs and maintain an efficient level of 
operation. Contract farming allows the firm to do this: 
the contract can include quality specifications, delivery 
times and prices, removing the risk and uncertainty that 
would be associated with sourcing raw materials from spot 
markets. 
Spot markets do not represent the only alternative to 
contract farming arrangements. Estate production can 
supply a firm with a regular and reliable source of 
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inputs for processing or marketing. However this 
involves the firm in significant additional expenses, 
specifically in buying or leasing land, establishing 
plantations and hiring a workforce. In some countries, 
local land tenure systems mean that access to land, 
whether on a leasehold or freehold basis, is constrained. 
Employing a workforce can also bring unexpected problems. 
In addition to direct wage costs, estate labour carries 
considerable transaction costs to ensure high labour 
productivity: hiring, training and supervision. It 
carries risks of disruption through industrial action. 
By contrast contract farming has no direct labour costs 
and the risks of poor performance are carried by the 
farmer who is paid for what he produces, providing him 
with strong incentives to acquire and develop his skills. 
The arrangement may also provide access to household 
labour; in order to meet the contract, a farmer may draw 
on all the labour resources available within the 
household, requiring members to work long hours without 
regard to the return to their labour. By contrast, hired 
wage earners work on the basis of a fixed working day. 
These introductory remarks provide a broad overview of 
the theoretical issues which may recommend contract 
farming arrangements to firms and growers. Key issues 
appear to be access to marketing and other agricultural 
services for farmers and, for firms, the need to offset 
investments in expensive marketing or processing 
facilities by capturing a reliable supply of raw 
materials. 
In the following sections the experience of schemes in 
Sub Saharan Africa will be assessed. Access to reports 
at the Commonwealth Development Corporation, which has 
been involved in many outgrower schemes in the region, 
provided the author with many insights which were 
supplemented by the opportunity to discuss issues arising 
with a number of CDC managers in London. CDC has also 
carried out its own evaluation of smallholder schemes 
(Ellman, 1989). A literature search indicated that the 
literature on contract farming in Africa is not 
extensive, although there are two important recent 
collections of papers. A study edited by Little and 
Watts (1994) brings together a number of case studies on 
Sub Saharan Africa, including the substantial work 
undertaken by Jaffee at the World Bank on Kenyan 
Horticulture. Another collection of studies (Eastern 
Africa Economic Review, 1989) edited by Ayako and Glover, 
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who has written extensively on contract farming, covers 
some additional schemes, including asparagus in Lesotho. 
One area which has received relatively more attention is 
gender issues within contract farming systems given the 
significant impact that agricultural diversification and 
commoditisation has had on the household economy and the 
allocation of resources within it. This is examined in 
Section Two. 
One conclusion drawn by those writing on contract 
farming/outgrower schemes is that they have not been 
employed as extensively in Africa to stimulate increased 
agricultural production as they have been in Latin 
America and Asia. This may explain the limited 
literature available. A recent discussion on contract 
farming on the Development Finance Network (an electronic 
discussion group operated by the FAO) indicated a dearth 
of knowledge on African case studies among researchers, 
apart from the well documented Kenyan experience. 
However one contributor indicated that anecdotal evidence 
suggests more companies may be involved in small 
outgrower schemes for export shipment than is generally 
acknowledged. More field research is needed. 
This study draws from the secondary literature reviewed 
as well as recent visit reports by NRI consultants to the 
Southern Africa region (Stringfellow, 1995; Coulter and 
Hindmarsh, 1995; Green, Steele and Willemse, 1995). 
Section One: Factors influencing the establishment of 
contract far.ming/outgrower schemes 
Techno-economic factors 
If the advantages of contract farming arrangements over 
spot market purchases or estate production lie mainly in 
(i) the control that this gives firms over the flow of 
raw materials into their processing or marketing systems; 
and (ii) the access to self-exploitative rather than 
hired labour, it is reasonable to expect that such 
institutional arrangements will be found in situations 
where a high degree of control is required in raw 
material delivery and production processes are highly 
labour intensive. For example where raw materials must 
meet stringent quality criteria, are highly perishable 
(so delivery must be carefully co-ordinated) or require 
very intensive husbandry, contract farming has the 
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potential to reduce the risk of costly delays to the 
firm. 
Horticultural crops fall into this category: they are 
highly perishable, they require close co-ordination of 
production with processing or with fresh produce 
marketing, and quality is essential, providing strong 
incentives for commodity buyers to provide inputs and 
technical advice to outgrowers. In addition, the 
relatively high value per unit volume or weight of 
horticultural crops makes crop collection systems over a 
decentralised area cost effective. 
Asparagus production and marketing in Lesotho provides an 
example of the influence of such techno-economic factors 
on institutional design (Rugege and Santho, 1989) . 
Asparagus production is labour intensive because the 
plants are very sensitive to weeds, requiring careful and 
constant weeding and at harvest the spears have to be 
timed as they emerge out of the soil in the early hours 
of the morning. In the 1970s when the UNDP/FAO was 
designing an asparagus scheme for Lesotho, an outgrower 
operation was a preferred institutional option over 
estate labour. It has proved very successful. 
French beans provide another example. Hortiequip, the 
administrative unit in Kenya for France's largest 
vegetable processing firm, Compagnie Saupiquet, has 
invested in the production of French beans under an 
outgrower system because of the highly intensive nature 
of production (Jaffee in Little and Watts, 1994). The 
alternative, a nucleus estate with a large labour force, 
was not favoured because of the high costs of 
supervision. 
Among non-horticultural crops, cotton is often grown 
under contract. In non-mechanised production systems, 
harvesting is highly labour intensive and where climatic 
conditions increase susceptibility to pest and diseases, 
careful supervision and crop husbandry are required. 
The need for careful supervision and co-ordination in 
production and processing recommends tea as a suitable 
commodity for smallholder production. In order to ensure 
high quality, plucking standards (two leaves and a bud) 
need to be maintained and the tea rapidly processed after 
harvest. In Kenya the Kenya Tea Development Authority 
has since 1964 operated a smallholder scheme which by 
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1984 included nearly 200,000 smallholders (Ayako et al., 
1989). In Malawi the Smallholder Tea Authority had some 
5,000 smallholders in 1984 (CDC database). 
However there are other important examples of contract 
farming and outgrower schemes in Africa where techno-
economic factors do not seem to have played a direct role 
in the institutional design of production. With regard 
to horticultural crops for example, the predominant 
institutional mode in Kenya for the production of 
strawberries and cut flowers has not been contract 
farming but large-scale vertically integrated operations, 
even though these crops are very labour intensive, have 
high perishability and require strict quality and 
delivery standards. By contrast sugar cane, which under 
an irrigated production system requires the assignment of 
most production and harvest tasks to the scheme 
management, not to smallholders, making it an obvious 
estate crop, is grown in several outgrower schemes in 
Africa. Thus though the technical and production 
characteristics of crops can explain to some degree the 
historical incidence of contract farming in Africa, other 
explanatory factors are required. In the following 
discussion, a number of these are proposed. 
Access to markets 
This has two aspects: the necessary physical 
infrastructure and transport linkages to move production 
to markets; and sufficient economic incentives in the 
form of profitable market opportunities. 
A recent discussion on the FAO sponsored Development 
Finance Network highlighted the importance of suitable 
transport infrastructure in the successful development of 
contract farming arrangements, citing as an example the 
production of green beans in the Kilimanjaro region of 
Tanzania where there are regular flights to Europe from 
Kilimanjaro International Airport. But this success is 
also linked to the existence of a large, high value 
market for green beans in Europe, a factor which 
encouraged French investment in Kenya, as noted above. 
Similarly, the success of the outgrower scheme for the 
production of asparagus in Lesotho owes much to a strong 
European market which is likely to increase as 
traditional asparagus exporting countries show a decline 
in production (Taiwan) and production in Europe 
stagnates. In addition, Lesotho has the marketing 
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advantage of exporting to Europe off-season (Rugege and 
Santho, op.cit.). 
Identifying and accessing markets is an activity which 
requires well capitalised and well linked entrepreneurs 
willing to take advantage of new opportunities. Entering 
high-value export markets is a costly business which 
requires information on markets and on the 
characteristics of consumer and retail demand (i.e. 
quality, packaging, seasonality); on technical and 
marketing innovations of competitors; on tariff and non-
tariff barriers and preferences; and on importing, 
wholesale and retail marketing channels. 
Once an opportunity has been identified, the firm will 
face further start up costs in selecting and training 
growers and adapting technologies to new environments. 
Returning again to the example of green beans in Kenya, 
Hortiequip quickly encountered serious technical and 
organisational problems when it tried to replicate a 
successful outgrower scheme for green beans developed in 
Morocco in Kenya. The company incurred losses in the 
early stages as a result of poor yields and poor loan 
recovery. A smaller company might have gone into 
receivership under such pressures but with a well 
resourced parent company behind it, Hortiequip was able 
to bear the initial losses, surviving into the next 
season when it introduced changes to the technology 
package and _placed stricter controls on its outgrowers, 
resulting in a significant improvement in the volume and 
quality of production (Jaffee, op.cit.). 
In Lesotho the ability of a new project to survive 
through a difficult start up period owed less to the 
financial muscle of a parent company and more to the 
availability of long term project financing through 
donors. From the outset in the early 1970s the UNDP/FAO 
played a lead role in the development of the asparagus 
scheme in Lesotho, subsidising the cost of extension, new 
infrastructure and technical personnel. At the time this 
approach was quite acceptable and, as discussed below, 
many projects were financed with concessionary lines of 
credit in a similar way. In the changed economic climate 
of the mid 1990s, this seems unlikely to happen again. 
The competitive environment 
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As well as access to markets, to operate a successful 
contract farming scheme a firm must be able to ensure 
that it has exclusive purchase of the output of its 
growers. Where the company has monopsony powers, this 
control is guaranteed. Where there is competition for 
procurement, the risk of leakage increases. In Kenya the 
Kenya Tea Development Authority, Mumias Sugar Company and 
British American Tobacco have had monopsony control over 
their targeted crop, one of the key factors behind the 
generally successful operation of these schemes. In 
Lesotho the Basotho Fruits and Vegetables Canners Ltd, 
the cannery set up with the assistance of the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund, is the sole buyer of 
asparagus. 
Another example from Kenya, the case of Kenya 
Horticultural Exports (KHE) in the Matuu Yatta region, 
illustrates what can happen when a company doesn't have 
this control (Jaffee, op.cit.). KHE, which had a market 
to supply "Asian" vegetables to the UK, agreed 
contractual arrangements with groups of farmers in the 
Matuu Yatta region. The contract committed KHE to 
provide inputs, set up collection centres for crops, 
develop nurseries, and provide information on production 
techniques. In return the farmers were to meet purchase 
orders which specified types and volumes of crops to be 
purchased on a weekly and monthly basis, indicating 
prices to be paid for the entire season. But the 
presence of competition in the area meant that farmers 
were able to breach the contract and find alternative 
buyers who were not providing any production support and 
were therefore able to pay higher prices. KHE soon 
learnt that in the competitive trading environment that 
existed, contract farming arrangements were not 
sustainable. 
The problems experienced by KHE are an indication of the 
fact that by the late 1970s and early 1980s the fresh 
horticulture market in the country had developed to such 
a degree that it was attracting many small scale firms 
who recognised that there were opportunities for trade 
without the need to invest in developing long term 
relationships with growers. Technology transfer efforts 
by pioneering firms had been successful: new technologies 
had been disseminated and a sufficient market had 
developed in horticultural products to allow buying 
companies to operate through spot purchasing and by 
offering immediate cash. Given this competition, more 
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established firms like KHE found that contractual 
arrangements broke down as their new competitors had 
lower overheads and could offer higher farm gate prices. 
Similar problems faced Oil Crop Development(OCD) Ltd in 
Kenya which discontinued contract farming arrangements 
for sunflower because of the difficulty encountered in 
policing contracts in a market in which many millers, 
running at considerable excess capacity, competed to buy 
sunflower seed. The millers were able to free ride on 
OCD's investment in quality seed which it had been 
supplying to its growers (Ayako et.al., op cit.) 
In Zambia, the Zambia Cashew Company was not able to 
recoup its investment costs, both in processing 
facilities and in developing a new commodity in the area 
(investments in planting material and developing 
appropriate husbandry techniques), as farmers were able 
to sell to other companies offering higher prices 
because, as in the KHE case in Kenya, they didn't have to 
offset development costs against the price paid 
(Gilchrist and Wallis, 1992). 
The examples illustrate that in an open economic 
environment firms face a serious problem of leakage which 
make investments in contract farming much riskier than 
under arrangements where competition is very limited. It 
is a problem which has become much more evident in Africa 
with the demise of parastatals and single marketing 
channels, which in the past allowed governments to make 
deductions for inputs and extension provided to 
outgrowers through the stop order system. 
In its efforts to attract foreign investors into the 
cotton industry in Mozambique, the government has sought 
to get around this problem by offering companies 
monopsony powers over growers in different regions of the 
country, creating a regionalised single channel marketing 
system. The drawback is that this leaves the growers 
with little negotiating power vis-a vis the company, 
which, if the company abuses its position, could lead to 
a breakdown in relationships between the two sides and a 
disruption in production. The implications of this for 
the successful development of outgrower schemes will be 
discussed in Section Two but it is worth noting that in 
Uganda the government was unwilling to adopt a similar 
policy for the cotton sector, despite pressure from 
potential investors. 
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An alternative approach would be for governments to 
improve or enforce legal provisions for breach of 
contract. In Zambia the Agricultural Credit Act of 1995 
will allow lenders to take action not only against 
defaulters, but against third parties who purchase 
pledged production. The enforcement of the new Act will 
require commitment and resources which may be beyond the 
capacity of the state, although one lender believed the 
law, as a deterrent to the diversion of sales, would 
still be effective (interview with Mr P Kangwa, ZCF 
Financial Services, Zambia). 
Another option is for companies to agree not to undercut 
each other by restricting purchases to their "own" 
farmers. In the north of Ghana there appears to be such 
an agreement in operation among the seven cotton 
companies, creating a voluntary single channel system 
which has the advantage of being more flexible than a 
system backed by legislation. 
The role of government and donor agencies 
The willingness of the Mozambican government to offer to 
limit competition in the Mozambican cotton industry 
illustrates the key role that government policy continues 
to play in the development of contract farming and 
outgrower schemes. 
However in the 1960s and 1970s, at a time of much greater 
state intervention in economic development, government 
did not limit itself to influencing the policy 
environment but was actively involved in setting up 
smallholder outgrower schemes, either directly or through 
parastatal organisations and often with the support of 
donors. The Commonwealth Development Corporation played 
a particularly important role in Sub Saharan Africa. 
For example in Malawi the Smallholder Tea Authority and 
Smallholder Sugar Authority (established in 1967 and 
1977 respectively) were statutory authorities set up by 
government and funded by donors and CDC. In Kenya the 
Kenyan Tea Authority was established in 1964 with 
investment capital from domestic government and external 
sources (CDC, World Bank, European Investment Bank and 
OPEC) . The government also set up several sugar 
outgrower schemes with donor support. In Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ghana and in the Francophone countries, 
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state cotton parastatals, which controlled all the 
marketing of cotton, operated outgrower schemes. In West 
Africa, state parastatals in Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire and 
Ghana combined estate cultivation with outgrower schemes 
on oil plantation schemes . 
As discussed above, given the much reduced risk of 
leakage under a monopsonistic marketing system, the 
coincidence of state marketing policies and contract 
farming/outgrower arrangements during this period is not 
surprising. But government enthusiasm for outgrower 
schemes was based on other considerations as well. 
Outgrower schemes were often settlement schemes involving 
the clearing of previously undeveloped land and the 
settlement of landless people. They also represented an 
opportunity to link subsistence producers into the cash 
economy. The Swazi government was explicit in supporting 
outgrower schemes as a means of attaining its objective 
of transforming Swazi Nation farmers from subsistence to 
commercial farming. Other projects were intended to 
contribute to national self-sufficiency in staple 
commodities, for example the Jahaly-Pacharr irrigated 
rice scheme in the Gambia and the smallholder sugar 
projects in Malawi and Kenya. As a consequence, 
governments subsidised the cost of schemes and donors 
often invested resources on favourable terms. 
Outgrower schemes also had the advantage of allowing 
governments to bring foreign investment into the country 
without requiring it to make the politically sensitive 
decision of granting a foreign company land rights. 
In the 1980s and 1990s a shift in economic thinking away 
from state-led to private sector development and the 
dissolution of many parastatal and marketing boards means 
that it is unlikely that outgrower and contract farming 
schemes will emerge in the future as the result of 
government or donor investment in publicly funded and 
managed development schemes. The long term concessionary 
finance which was available in earlier years for these 
schemes is also disappearing. As a result all the set up 
and development costs in any new scheme will have to be 
carried by the private sector. In these circumstances 
the commercial viability of a scheme, rather than concern 
for any broader development objective, will be the main 
criterion on which investment decisions will be based. 
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However recent research in Malawi and Zambia suggests 
that the government and donor community still has an 
important role to play in the development of contract 
farmer/outgrower schemes. Providing traders with access 
to market information is one key area, both at the level 
of regional and international markets. Creating a 
conducive policy environment is another important role, 
including a legal framework which provides for the 
proper enforcement of contracts. Public investment in 
communication systems is another vital function. A 
further role for government is raising awareness to 
encourage participation in schemes, and education to 
ensure better implementation. 
With regard to donors, in Zambia the European Union 
funded Smallholder Development Project (SDP) at Mpongwe 
is organising smallholder outgrowers into groups. The 
rationale for this is to reduce the additional costs to a 
company of working with many small scale, dispersed 
individuals, a major disincentive to working with the 
smallholder, by encouraging farmers to take on 
distribution and primary marketing functions. At Kabwe 
the SDP is promoting outgrower schemes by inviting 
traders to apply for concessionary funding to establish 
new schemes. 
Section Three will examine the Malawi and Zambia 
experience in more detail, but the examples indicate the 
important role of governments and donors in creating an 
enabling environment for private enterprise. 
Conclusions 
Techno-economic considerations provide some explanation 
for the emergence of contract farming and outgrower 
schemes in Sub Saharan Africa since the 1960s but the 
influence of marketing issues (access to markets, 
marketing opportunities, the competitive environment) and 
the economic development strategies of national 
governments and development organisations (smallholder 
development strategies, settlement programmes, national 
food self-sufficiency), have also played a very 
significant role. However through the 1980s and 1990s, 
as national development strategies have become 
increasingly market led, these two influences have 
coincided. Thus new investments in agriculture are 
likely to be private sector led and the decision to 
employ contract farmers or outgrowers will be based on 
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considerations of cost effectiveness and efficiency. The 
role of government and donors will be to provide an 
enabling environment for private investment. 
Section Two: The deter.minants of successful contract 
far.ming/outgrower schemes 
In an analysis of factors that appear to contribute to 
the success of contract farming schemes, success can be 
defined as the provision of mutual benefits creating an 
equilibrium between the interests of the company and 
growers. In this scenario, growers have strong 
incentives to supply the company at the required times 
and with production of sufficient volume and quality to 
ensure good company profits. A broader definition of 
success should look also at the impact of the scheme on 
the economic and social development of the region in 
which it is operating. 
The factors influencing a successful outcome can be 
divided into two sets: internal factors to the scheme 
(factors over which the company and growers have control, 
e.g. services provided, the pricing and payments system, 
the choice of technology) and external ones (e.g. 
international prices, the macroeconomic situation, 
climatic factors) . 
Key internal issues: 
(i) provision of services to outgrowers 
As discussed above, the contractual relationship between 
growers and the company in a contract farming scheme 
provides the latter with the assurance that it will have 
access to a share of the benefits from the investments it 
makes in production at the farm level. The company 
therefore has a direct interest in providing effective 
extension services and adequate input services to ensure 
a supply of high quality, low cost produce. From the 
farmers' perspective, the services provided by the 
company may represent the only access to inputs and 
training advice available. 
The experience of sugar schemes in Africa demonstrates a 
high level of company service provision. Machinery 
services are provided for land preparation and harvesting 
as well as extension services. Inputs (fertiliser, 
irrigation water, seed cane and pesticides) are provided 
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on credit. Costs are deducted at source. Extension 
staff to farmer ratios in schemes are lower than the 
national average. 
The availability of extension services has been key to 
the success of asparagus production in Lesotho, provided 
through the MOA and the company itself. In contract 
growing schemes in Swaziland more than 70% of farmers 
reported experiencing no problems in receiving extension 
advice and adequate and timely inputs to undertake 
production (Sithole and Boeren, 1989) . 
It is possible that the demand for extension officers 
generated by the private sector for contract grower 
schemes may produce a negative externality on the 
agricultural sector as a whole. In Lesotho some of the 
most experienced extension officers in the MOA have been 
seconded to the asparagus scheme (Rugege and Santho, 
op.cit.) and a similar situation has been reported in 
Kenya on the KTDA. Given the private sector's ability to 
pay better wages that the government, this development is 
of no surprise. Alternatively, the training provided to 
extension agents and the technological assistance 
transmitted to farmers might be sufficient to compensate 
for the loss to the public sector. 
The supply of agricultural services can be financed in 
two ways: by the company directly, in which case the 
costs are deducted at source after harvest; or through 
credit provided by a bank at which the farmer holds an 
account and into which the company pays him/her at 
harvest directly (effectively reducing the risk of 
default as the bank is able to deduct the loan repayment 
at source) . The first arrangement appears to be much 
more common even though it increases the working capital 
requirements of the company very considerably. It may 
also be less efficient as it involves the company, rather 
than the bank as a specialist financial intermediary, in 
the process of lending. On the other hand the reluctance 
of many banks to lend to the agricultural sector, and 
particularly to smallholders, may explain why companies 
are required to take on this additional expense. 
Where the company is providing credit, repayment is a 
crucial issue. Where farmers have access to a variety of 
buyers, there are strong incentives to breach the 
contract and avoid repaying debts to the company, as 
noted above in Kenya. In Zambia, the management of the 
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Zambia Cashew Company decided to abandon its extension 
services in 1989 because it was not able to capture the 
benefits of its investments through tied procurement. 
Overall, as the private sector increasingly assumes the 
leading role in agricultural development, the extent to 
which it provides service to its growers will be 
determined by its own estimates of the likely returns to 
such investments. The present behaviour of two private 
companies operating in the cotton sub sector in Zambia 
indicates that there will be no uniform approach. On the 
one hand Lonrho has invested considerable resources in 
extension services for its farmers; by contrast Cargill 
limits itself to procurement services. 
(ii) choice of technology 
A number of large outgrower schemes have been irrigation 
schemes, often in newly developed areas involving 
settlers. The advantages they bring are higher yields 
and greater reliability as irrigation removes the risk of 
crop failure which is a regular occurrence in the semi-
arid areas of Africa. 
By nature large irrigation schemes are capital intensive, 
requiring central management and they therefore have high 
overheads, which have to be passed back to the farmer in 
high fees. In the case of sugar, the economies of large-
scale irrigated production and co-ordinated harvest and 
delivery require the assignment of most production and 
harvesting tasks to the scheme management. In the case 
of irrigated cotton and rice, irrigated production 
requires the farmer to be present full-time on the 
scheme. 
Experience shows that both situations have led to 
problems. In Zimbabwe irrigated cotton outgrowers• 
schemes at Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi involved formally 
signed contracts, which restricted farmers• non-farm 
activities and required their full-time farming presence 
on the scheme (Jackson and Cheater, 1989). In practice 
farmers did not comply because they were involved in 
livestock husbandry and non-farm activities. Among 
households permanently resident in semi-arid to near 
desert climates a diversified household economy of this 
kind is a rational response to the high risk environment. 
By failing to take account of this and introducing a 
production system that required a full time farming 
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presence, the scheme's planners were flying in the face 
of long established multiple income strategies. 
Labour scarcity has been a major problem for the Jahaly-
Pacharr irrigated rice scheme in the Gambia, which was 
implemented by the government in 1984 with IFAD funding, 
and is based on contract farming (Carney, 1994). 
Production on the scheme is governed by a rigid cropping 
schedule which requires strict adherence as any deviation 
would skew the demand for labour, delay planting, disrupt 
the watering cycle and diminish productivity. From the 
outset the management of the scheme and the (male) heads 
of household in the region expected women to provide 
substantial portions of the additional labour required 
for irrigated cultivation. Their long-standing 
experience in rice cultivation (lowland rice cultivation 
is a traditional activity for rural Gambian women) was 
seen as critical in easing the labour bottlenecks during 
the wet season. However given that the irrigated land 
was farmed under the control of the male household head, 
and therefore women could not appropriate production, the 
women proved very reluctant to provide their labour, 
especially as many had lost access to their own lowland 
rice lands through the project. Households were thrown 
into crisis as women resisted a new situation which had 
increased the economic power of male heads of household 
whilst reducing their access to resources. In households 
where men refused to compensate the women, the women 
often withdrew their labour, lowering the targeted 
estimates of rice production for the project and leading 
to a high rate of default among farmers. 
In the case of sugar, an irrigated production system has 
the opposite effect, reducing the demand for household 
labour because of the need to centrally co-ordinate 
cultivation activities including mechanised seedbed 
preparation, burning of the cane and harvesting by gangs 
of labour which clear the cane quickly before it starts 
growing again. Farmers are required to irrigate, 
fertilise and weed the cane. The costs of the centrally 
provided services are deducted from the price farmers 
receive at harvest. If these overheads also include a 
component for the capital costs of the irrigation scheme 
itself, as they have done on a number of settlement 
schemes, the returns to the smallholders are even further 
reduced. 
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Ellman (op. cit., 1989), in an evaluation of a number of 
smallholder schemes, including sugar schemes suggests 
that capital intensive technologies of this kind may not 
be in the smallholders' or the company's best interests 
as incentives to high productivity are reduced by the 
high overheads charged. Where machinery is imported, 
farmers are additionally exposed to foreign exchange 
risks which over the 1980s have been very severe in 
Africa. Family labour by contrast is under-utilised 
which, if diversification is discouraged because of the 
need to maximise factory throughput of the main crop 
(which it has been on a number of schemes), prevents the 
farming household from making efficient use of its most 
abundant factor of production. Ellman therefore argues 
for better use of labour intensive techniques - animal 
draught, diversified cropping patterns, especially for 
food crops, and the least possible dependence on imported 
technologies possible to keep down overhead costs and 
minimise exchange risk. 
As suggested above, technical factors in the growing of 
irrigated cane limit the extent to which smallholders can 
take on more production tasks. In some schemes returns 
to production from irrigation have been so high because 
of higher yields, that farmers have accepted the capital 
intensive technology. For example in Swaziland farmers 
on the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms have found sugar cane 
farming to be relatively easy and profitable, reducing 
incentives to grow other crops. However in this case a 
sugar pricing formula agreed between millers and growers 
has allowed farmers to receive a high share of the value 
added by the milling sector. 
These examples suggest the diversity of experience with 
schemes that have introduced irrigated technologies into 
the farming systems of smallholders. Where these have 
imposed production schedules that demand strict timing of 
work routines, changes in the way that household 
production is organised and in social relations have 
resulted. In the case of the Gambia, these changes have 
threatened the viability of the scheme. In Swaziland, 
improved income earning opportunities have compensated 
for the changes. The lesson is that the planning of 
successful schemes requires a thorough understanding of 
(i) the existing farming system of the smallholders who 
are to be involved and (ii) the intra-household economy 
(specifically access to and control over land and labour 
resources by different household members) in order to be 
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able to predict what the impact of new technologies will 
be. 
(iii) food crops and food security 
As suggested above, a succcessful approach to designing 
contract farming or outgrower schemes needs to recognise 
the complexity of the household economy. Where food 
crops are an important component of the household farming 
system, the experience of many schemes suggests that 
farmers will prioritise the production of these over cash 
crops. For example in semi-arid areas of Ghana outgrower 
cotton production is attractive to farmers as it provides 
access through the company to fertiliser, which is 
otherwise beyond the means of most farmers. Both the 
cotton companies and the farmers themselves acknowledge 
that much of the fertiliser provided for cotton is used 
on food crops, depressing cotton yields. In response 
some companies are extending services to farmers to 
include food crops. For example Nulux Cotton Company 
which is based in Tamale, now provides fertiliser, 
pesticide and herbicide for use on farmers• maize and 
other food crops in addition to the inputs which are 
designated for use on cotton plots (Warner 1995). 
Farmers on the South Nyanza Sugar Scheme in Kenya have 
also demonstrated a preference for a guaranteed food 
supply over cash income. Though the returns to labour 
for cane are higher than for maize, farmers have not put 
all their land under cane and become reliant on purchased 
food crops. In a survey, farmers said this was because 
purchased maize was not readily available and was of poor 
quality. A certain stigma was also attached to 
purchasing maize as this indicated that a farmer could 
not feed himself (Williams et al, 1989). 
However in a dynamic situation cultural norms are likely 
to respond to the changing economic environment. Another 
survey in South Nyanza suggests that cane production 
might be accentuating gender inequalities in the 
household. As men, who make up the majority of 
outgrowers in the scheme (about 84%), see their economic 
status enhanced through access to cash, women, who are 
responsible for food crops, have less time available for 
food production as they are required to work on their 
husbands• sugar cane (Muir et al., 1990). Within the 
household cash earned is traditionally controlled by the 
man and he is not required to compensate his wife for her 
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labour. If an enhanced income status leads him to 
redefine what is culturally valued in terms of material 
objects (consumer durables etc.), he may become less 
concerned to meet the household•s consumption needs, 
putting more pressure on his wife to produce cane rather 
than food crops. If this reduces food availability, the 
impact on food security for the household as a whole may 
be negative. 
A review of existing studies on food security in the 
Sahel (Dione, 1990) provides a more positive view of the 
potential contribution of cash crops to food security. 
By contributing to a farmer•s cash income, marketed crops 
can provide the required capital to develop his or her 
productive capacity and, as a consequence, ability to 
respond to prices. This may enhance self-sufficiency in 
grain products (through higher productivity) and spread 
production risk over a wider range of crops. Obviously 
whether these benefits are realised depends on the 
producer•s decision to invest rather than consume cash 
income. The evidence of a study conducted in Mali shows 
that farmers engaged in cotton production do produce more 
cereal crops than those who grow only cereal crops 
(Dione, 1989). 
A further explanation for this is that some cash crops 
have a beneficial "carry-over•• effect on food production. 
The same study from Mali shows that large investment in 
cotton in the Compagnie Malienne de Textiles (CMDT) zone 
has brought technical improvements (animal traction, 
residual effects of fertiliser in crop rotations) which 
have contributed to increasing crop yields. 
The example of the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms Scheme 
(discussed above) provides another positive example. 
Farmers have specialised in cane, growing relatively 
little else despite company credit and inputs for other 
crops. Whether this has generated intra-household 
conflict is not known. In other situations, local agro-
climatic and market conditions may be more suitable for 
cash or export crops than food crops in which case there 
may be significant welfare gains from trade. For example 
sunflower in Kenya is a cash crop which grows well in 
marginal areas where there are few alternatives, 
providing farmers with a crucial source of cash income. 
In Lesotho, asparagus grown under the Thaba-Bosiu Rural 
Development Project (TBRDP), which is well suited to the 
restrictive climatic conditions of the country, provides 
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outgrowers with much higher returns than food crops. 
There is no evidence that asparagus production has 
undermined food production: the company has limited 
outgrower plots to 0.2 ha, allowing farmers to produce 
food crops on the remainder of their land (the average 
farm size in Lesotho is 1.6 ha). 
The evidence on contract farming schemes in Africa 
suggests that where land is fairly abundant and farmers 
have had the freedom to diversify their crops and income 
sources, food supply has been adequate. For example in 
Zimbabwe the experience of different tea outgrower 
schemes indicates that where outgrowers have been able to 
grow tea as one among a range of agricultural and other 
non-farm activities, schemes have been successful, in 
contrast to other schemes where rigid adherence to tea 
production has not worked well. 
Reduction of food supply is most likely to be a problem 
in areas where availability of land is a constraint. 
Writing on the Smallholder Coffee Authority in Malawi, 
Ellman (op.cit., 1989) observes that the emphasis placed 
on coffee by the Authority may not have created conflicts 
yet, despite the fact that families have a diversified 
cropping system, but an expansion of coffee planting 
could expose farmers to the possible negative effects of 
mono-cropping. The most serious of these is increased 
exposure to risk: where a farmer is able to offset 
production or marketing losses (through a fall in price) 
of one commodity against another, the overall risk to the 
household economy is much reduced. Schemes that have 
restricted production of non-contract crops, which have 
tended to be settlement schemes where considerable 
resources have been invested in irrigation technologies 
(for example cotton and sugar schemes in Zimbabwe and 
Kenya) have tended to encounter problems not only in food 
production, but in maintaining adequate levels of 
recruitment and participation. Therefore in designing 
successful schemes, the importance of paying adequate 
attention to the farm household's existing risk 
management strategies cannot be over-emphasised. 
(iv) procurement and payments 
It is through procurement arrangements that marketing 
risk between grower and firm is allocated. As firms are 
often trading in highly volatile export markets, the more 
risk they can pass on to the farmer in the form of 
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adjustments in the price paid or the quantity purchased, 
the less they are exposed themselves. The firm's 
monopsony position vis-a vis the grower which is implied 
by the contract, places it in a strong position to do 
this. The grower of course has the opposite objective 
and will want to minimise the risk he or she faces by 
selling whatever is produced at a favourable price. 
In practise, the resolution of these opposing positions 
is determined by (i) the availability of alternative 
marketing channels for growers; (ii) the availability of 
alternative cropping systems; (iii) government policy; 
(iv) the degree to which farmers can bargain 
collectively. Where growers can find alternative outlets 
for their production which offer a better price, they 
will do so, as the case of horticultural production in 
Kenya, which was discussed above demonstrates. Though 
this may place growers in breach of contract, there is 
little evidence in Africa of the enforcement of contracts 
because of legal inadequacies and the need for companies 
to maintain good public relations with farmers. If 
companies are not willing or able to pay a more 
attractive price to their growers to guarantee regular 
supply, their response may be to switch from a contract 
farming system to alternative modes of raw material 
supply, again as demonstrated by the Kenyan case. 
Where farmers can switch production to alternative 
commodities they may also be able to exert pressure on 
the firm to minimise the risk passed on to them. Annual 
crops give growers this flexibility but where resources 
have been invested in tree crops, or where no alternative 
source of cash income exists, growers' options are 
limited. 
On schemes involving public or donor funds, the 
government (or another public institution) , often under 
political pressure, has sometimes used its influence to 
balance the interests of the growers and the company. 
For example in Kenya, the KTDA pays growers a fixed 
first payment on delivery and then a second variable 
annual payment based on the price of tea achieved 
internationally. In Cote D'Ivoire the payments system 
developed by the Societe Africaine de Plantations 
D'Heveas (SAPH) operates a price stabilisation mechanism 
which guarantees an attractive price to smallholders and 
a good return to SAPH. In 1984, the Malawi government 
was prepared to subsidise payments to sugar outgrowers 
26 
when prices were very low and barely covered costs. In 
Swaziland the Swaziland Sugar Association, a parastatal 
representing growers and millers equally, markets all 
the sugar produced in the country, deducts its costs and 
then passes on payments to millers and growers in 
accordance with an agreed formula which breaks down 
roughly 60%/40% in favour of growers. The significance 
of this arrangement is that it does not treat farmers as 
the last group to receive a return for their effort: 
instead they are given a majority share of total profits 
accruing to the whole process of sugar production, 
including a share of the value added through processing. 
However an effort by the Smallholder Sugar Authority in 
Malawi to draw up a Sale of Cane agreement with Lonhro on 
this basis was not successful. Lonrho wanted the 
government to guarantee the future price of sugar at 
constant 1976 level which the government was not prepared 
to do. The company was in effect trying to shift the 
price risk from the smallholder to the government but the 
bottom line was that it was not prepared to take it on 
itself (CDC database) . 
The likelihood of other African governments being willing 
to bear some of the risk of price fixing and 
stabilisation on behalf of private companies seems very 
remote given present macro-economic conditions. The 
position of the Mozambican government which, as discussed 
above, has been prepared to reduce the bargaining 
position of its smallholders in an effort to attract 
foreign capital, seems a more likely indication of the 
direction of government policy in the future. In these 
circumstances, in the absence of competitors, a company 
will be much freer to set the price paid to growers 
according to what it perceives to be in its own best 
interests. 
(v) growers' organisations 
Under these circumstances the ability of growers to 
bargain effectively with the company and represent their 
collective interests is crucial. In the schemes reviewed 
growers• organisations have at times played that role. 
For example on the asparagus project in Lesotho farmers 
are represented through the Setlabocha Farmers Co-
operative Society which acts as their agent in dealing 
with the company, collecting asparagus and ensuring that 
it is weighed and recorded properly as well as 
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negotiating on matters of price, bonus and asparagus 
quality. In the past company officials had collected, 
graded and weighed the crop and outgrowers had felt they 
were being cheated. The appointment of Co-operative 
officials to the board of the company has also been 
important in reassuring outgrowers that their interests 
are being taken into consideration in negotiations on 
price (Rugege and Santho, op.cit,). 
In addition to representation of outgrowers, farmer 
organisations may provide extension services to members. 
On the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms project a group of 
farmers established a co-operative to provide inputs and 
machinery services for members. Lintco, the former 
cotton parastatal in Zambia, had an active policy of 
encouraging farmer groups for input delivery and 
marketing. In addition the company encouraged groups to 
take on loans on the basis of group liability. Today in 
Ghana extension officers with the Ghana Cotton Company 
are expressing a keen interest in seeing farmers' groups 
take on a similar role. 
In general terms, greater involvement by farmers in 
service provision should lower costs, reducing a 
company's working capital requirements and the deduction 
made at procurement for services provided. The higher 
price paid as a result should also act as an incentive to 
farmers for increased performance. The disadvantage is 
that in their role as service providers, farmers' groups 
may be seen as serving the interest of the company as 
much as the interests of farmers. Especially in 
situations of potential conflict (for example when there 
is a fall in the international price of a commodity, 
leading to a lower price for growers) farmers may feel 
betrayed by their representatives if they are seen to be 
doing the company's work. On the other hand if the 
company feels that the farmers' organisation does serve 
its interests as well as the farmers, it may be more 
willing to invest resources in training executives and 
even the membership. This may be very important in 
creating effective farmers' organisations in situations 
where growers lack organisational experience and 
education. The experience of many farmers groups and co-
operatives in Africa provides many examples of 
embezzlement and other forms of criminal activity by 
elected officers. 
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Within the Francophone cotton system the parastatals 
themselves have played a central role in organising 
farmers. An example is the Compagnie Malienne de 
Textiles (CMDT) which from the early 1970s has organised 
farmers into Associations Villageoises (AVs) . Originally 
this was in response to a crisis created by the poor 
performance of input and credit suppliers who were felt 
by the farmers to be abusing their position (Fok, 1994). 
The AVs were given responsibility for the management of 
credit and input supplies, a move which was welcomed by 
the farmers. In addition to defusing a crisis, the CMDT 
hoped to benefit by a reduction in operating costs. 
In the process of establishing groups, much emphasis was 
placed on creating groups with sufficient basic skills in 
literacy and numeracy to become viable entities in their 
own right. In the 1991/92 season the CMDT organised a 
market information system to help the AVs sell their 
stocks of surplus grain to the trade (Coulter and Tyler, 
1993). Thus though it is clear that the CMDT's 
motivation in establishing the AVs was basically self-
interested, farmers have gained not only from greater 
autonomy but also from better access to training and 
information. 
Increasing farmer representation and responsibility on 
outgrower schemes may represent one managerial approach. 
At the other extreme at the Dwangwa Smallholder Sugar 
Project in Malawi a consultant commented in 1985 that the 
management style had always been authoritarian and the 
Disciplinary Committee effective, contributing to the 
success of the scheme (Edwards, 1985). He did add that 
the highly directive style might be difficult to 
replicate in a less disciplined society than Malawi and 
even within that country, in future years as farmers were 
better educated and had greater aspirations, such a style 
might no longer have a role to play. Management of the 
Smallholder Tea Authority in Malawi appears to have been 
similarly top down, with growers remaining very distant 
from management decision making procedures. In these 
circumstances it was observed that growers tended to 
allocate labour, land and capital to the production of 
tea on the basis of fatalism or trust, rather than on an 
evaluation of the likely returns (Cromwell, 1986). 
By contrast, it is likely that group mobilisation would 
lead farmers to adopt a longer term view of their self-
interest. Group forums would provide an opportunity for 
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discussion and self education about the broader economic 
environment, allowing farmers to make better informed and 
more strategic decisions in relation to production and 
marketing. 
Key external issues: 
(i) prices 
One important factor influencing the profitability of any 
outgrower scheme is the price (and price stability) of 
the commodity in the target market. In practise many of 
the schemes reviewed have been producing commodities for 
highly volatile markets: for example world prices for tea 
slumped in the late 1970s and again in the mid 1980s; 
sugar and cotton showed a similar trend. Even on schemes 
where the target market is a domestic one, lower than 
anticipated demand, as in the case of sugar in Malawi, 
combined with the country's landlocked position, 
restricting access to export markets, to depress prices. 
Government policies to fix prices of commodities have 
stabilised returns in some sub sectors. An alternative 
is for the industry itself to operate a domestic fund for 
price stabilisation. The CMDT has attempted this in Mali 
and in Cote D'Ivoire, the payments system developed by 
the Societe Africaine de Plantations D'Heveas (SAPH) 
includes a price stabilisation mechanism which guarantees 
an attractive price to smallholders and a good return to 
SAPH. 
At an international level the European Union's STABEX 
funds have assisted the Lome countries which have been 
affected by international commodity price swings. 
However the international lending institutions have 
criticised the use of national or international reserves 
as a means to stabilise prices, considering such efforts 
to be a form of subsidy which distorts factor prices. In 
the future therefore the availability of resources for 
price stabilisation is likely to diminish. 
A theoretical alternative to price stabilisation is 
insurance. Insurance markets in African agriculture are 
virtually non existent, certainly at the smallholder 
level. In Kenya, Hortiequip has tried to introduce its 
own insurance system for its bean growers. 
(ii) macroeconomic stability 
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Macroeconomic crisis and frequent devaluations have 
characterised the performance of many African economies 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Theoretically devaluation should 
provide improved incentives for the export sector but in 
practise a number of schemes have been negatively 
affected by the knock on effects of devaluation. Where 
the technology used is imported (for example machinery, 
fertilisers, agro-chemicals) higher costs can offset the 
improvement in output prices. Devaluation in 1989 hit 
the Zambia Cashew Company by wiping out the domestic 
market for cashew nuts. The poor quality of production 
restricted its access to the export market. 
In an economic climate of such uncertainty, efforts to 
decrease import dependence can contribute to the ultimate 
success of the scheme. 
(iii) climate 
Cyclical droughts in many parts of Africa pose a serious 
threat to investment. One of the reasons asparagus has 
been so successful in Lesotho is its drought resistance. 
Even irrigation projects can be affected by unseasonal 
lack of rainfall as in Malawi in 1991-92 when drought 
affected irrigation availability on the Duwanga Sugar 
Scheme. 
Conclusions 
Price shocks, macroeconomic instability and climatic 
factors significantly increase the risks facing a 
potential investor in Sub Saharan Africa. These must be 
offset by the comparative advantages of investing in a 
given location. 
Section Three: Prospects for the development of contract 
far.ming/outgrower schemes in Malawi and Zambia 
Malawi 
The Malawi government has been implementing a policy of 
agricultural market liberalisation since May 1988 through 
the Agricultural Marketing and Estate Development (AMED) 
Project under the Government•s Structural Adjustment 
Programme. The main aims of this project are to develop 
a multi-channel marketing system and to improve resource 
utilisation by providing medium-term credit to estates. 
An essential component of this has been the removal of 
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the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation's 
monopoly on export crops which had previously constrained 
private sector efforts to diversify out of traditional 
production. 
The main diversification crops are soybean and paprika. 
Interest has also been shown in dairying, dried 
vegetables, sunflower, guar gum and groundnuts. A recent 
NRI mission for the World Bank to appraise the 
developmental potential of minor industrial crops in the 
Southern Africa Region (Green et al., 1995), which 
selected candidate commodities on the basis of (i) known 
climatic suitability; (ii) potential for the entrance of 
a new supplier to the market; and (iii) maximising 
developmental impact, identified paprika, ginger, 
turmeric, West Indian lime oil, citronella, lemongrass, 
karaya gum, guar, castor oil and annatto as potential 
candidates for development in Malawi. Of these castor 
seed, guar seed, turmeric and ginger were all considered 
suitable for independent smallholder development. The 
essential oils, which are processed from the raw 
material, were identified as candidates for tenant 
farmer/outgrower schemes, as was paprika, which has a 
high extension requirement. 
The State Agricultural Research and Extension Trust 
(ARET) is encouraging large agribusiness companies like 
Press Agriculture (part of the Press Group, the largest 
company in Malawi, employing some 850 permanent staff and 
over 20,000 people on estates) to work with estates1 as 
outgrowers in the development of new crops. The company 
has made a strategic decision to develop new crop lines 
through outgrower arrangements. The belief is that by 
encouraging the larger estates and companies to take the 
initiative, a "trickle-down" effect will occur as smaller 
estates and smallholders adopt the new technologies as 
well through outgrower schemes. The market linkages 
formed in this way will assist smallholders in overcoming 
the problem of limited access to markets which the likely 
1 
"Estate" in Malawi is a legal concept, not associated with farm 
size, where cultivation takes place on leasehold or freehold rather 
than on customary land. Regulations which restricted tobacco 
production to the estate sector until very recently encouraged many 
smallholder farmers to become registered as estates. This movement 
has only been constrained by the requirement that estates are a 
minimum size of 10 ha. There are 30,000 estates in Malawi of which 
61\ are between 10 and 20 ha and 88\ are less than SO ha. About 3 
million people depend on the estates. 
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closure of subsidised ADMARC buying points under the 
current liberalisation programme is likely to worsen. 
From an organisational perspective, there are precedents 
as the nucleus estate system is not new in Malawi and the 
established tenant system is very similar in operation to 
an outgrower scheme2 • ARET itself was involved in an 
outgrower scheme for soybean in 1994. 
However the NRI study identified a number of constraints 
facing potential investors in Malawi. Market information 
on opportunities in local and export markets among 
traders and processors was found to very limited. This 
ignorance extends to the banks which are very wary of 
making loans for diversification, preferring to limit 
their agricultural portfolio to tobacco which they know 
well. 
Furthermore, despite the government 1 s commitment to 
liberalisation, its policy in a number of areas is 
directly constraining investment. The restriction on 
Asian traders which allows them only to trade within the 
four main towns is a very significant barrier. The 
taxation system imposes a range of disincentives: the 
government has recently imposed a 10% export tax; a 
higher rate of tax is charged on outside investors and 
the government levies a turnover tax. On the inputs 
side, import duties of between 20% and 40%, a surtax of 
between 1% and 6% and excise duty of 10%-20%, all of 
which are calculated incrementally, place considerable 
extra costs on investors. Another restriction is the 
difficulty facing companies which wish to employ non-
Malawi senior staff. Finally, uncertainty about 
government 1 s land policy and the future of leasehold 
properties is a further deterrent. 
The above suggests that government could do much to 
improve the enabling environment which has been 
highlighted earlier as a necessary condition for the 
development of successful outgrower schemes. However 
despite the constraints, the authors of the recent World 
2A tenant in Malawi is someone who grows a crop on estate land with 
land, inputs and food provided by the owner of the estate. The 
resultant crop is sold to the estate at the end of the year and costs 
of inputs and food supplied are deducted. The system has been used 
widely for burley tobacco production but under liberalisation more 
progressive estate owners are now extending the arrangements to other 
crops. 
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bank study report a positive attitude among major farming 
companies in Malawi. 
Information on the actual operation of recent outgrower 
schemes in Malawi is rather limited. A number of schemes 
reviewed during the course of this research, but these 
were established in the 1960s and 1970s with significant 
donor and government investment and management, a model 
which the author believes is less relevant to the present 
economic context. Studies of both the Smallholder Tea 
Authority and Smallholder Sugar Authority suggest that 
the style of management was not very sensitive to the 
needs of growers (see Section Two (v)), a factor which 
may have had a negative influence on the view taken by 
smallholders of outgrower schemes. Problems of high 
overhead charges (due to the choice of technology, 
foreign management costs and foreign denominated loans at 
a time of macro-economic instability)and the disruption 
of established farming systems (leading to inadequate 
food production) undermined the Dwangwa Smallholder Sugar 
project particularly(Edwards, op.cit.). On the other 
hand, government involvement in both schemes lead to 
efforts to maintain prices in the face of international 
price falls. 
Information on more recent outgrower schemes financed by 
the private sector is more limited. Cheetah Limited is 
promoting the cultivation of paprika in Malawi where ease 
of integration with Burley Tobacco production, no major 
problems of management even by tenant farmers and fair 
yields make it a suitable smallholder crop. Cheetah 
provides seed and technical guidance to growers on the 
condition of sell-back of the crop. In Malawi 90% of its 
production is rain-fed and is grown on tenant farms. The 
estate acts as an intermediary between Cheetah and the 
farmers. Cheetah's director described this relationship 
as working well, given the discipline of the estate 
system which makes farmers less likely to sell to other 
buyers (in contrast to his experience with smallholders 
in Zambia - see below) . However he fears that as the 
estate system breaks down under liberalisation and more 
buyers for paprika enter the market, discipline will 
break down and there will be a higher level of loan 
delinquency which could quickly undermine his operations. 
In these circumstances he would cease contracting 
smallholders (interview with Mark Turken, MD, Cheetah 
Zambia Ltd, October 1995). 
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No detailed information was available on the performance 
of the ARET soybean scheme. Other schemes are the 
production of guar gum by smallholders for Indian 
exporters based in Blantyre; production of sugar cane at 
Ntokohota; and production of cotton and sunflower with 
Lever Brothers in Southern Malawi. Little information 
about these schemes is available in the public domain. 
Zambia 
Progress towards a more diversified agricultural base is 
an important component of Zambian agricultural policy 
today in contrast to the maize monoculture promoted by 
the previous government in the 1980s. With an end to 
pan-territorial pricing for maize and the ending of 
direct support from government (through the state lending 
organisations)for input financing, producers in some 
areas are looking for alternative crops as well as 
alternative sources of input supply. Given the 
government's constrained access to resources to invest 
itself in product development, extension, marketing and 
input provision, it is looking increasingly to the 
private sector to take the lead. Outgrower schemes for 
smallholders are an attractive option: they should 
promote diversification whilst simultaneously sharing the 
benefits among the smallholder population, rather than 
confining them to a few commercial farmers. For this 
reason the Zambia National Farmers' Union and a number of 
donor programmes have given enthusiastic backing to the 
idea. 
A number of crops are already grown under contract in 
Zambia involving approximately 85,000 smallholders in 
1994, receiving some K 2.5 billion on credit. Of these, 
69,000 were growing cotton, mainly for Lintco, the state 
cotton company which has now been sold to Lonrho. There 
are 12,500 contract farmers under the Tobacco Development 
Company and Kestrel Tobacco Company has 2,300 farmers. 
Cheetah Zambia Ltd is operating on similar lines to its 
sister company in Malawi (see above) . It is working with 
both commercial farmers and smallholders, including a 
project with the EU funded Smallholder Development 
Programme (see below). 
A number of credit co-ordinators in the government's 
Input Distribution Programme, which provides seed and 
fertiliser to smallholders producing maize and which is 
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under the private sector management of SGS and Cavmont 
Bank, have used outgrower arrangements to distribute the 
inputs. These are provided farmers on credit in return 
for a commitment from the farmers to sell the crop back 
at harvest. 
The EU funded Smallholder Development Programme has also 
been promoting outgrower schemes. In the 1995/96 season 
traders wishing to establish outgrower schemes have been 
invited to submit proposals to the marketing credit fund 
in Kabwe. In Mpongwe the project is working with local 
entrepreneurs to assist groups of farmers diversify 
production. Castor bean and tobacco have been produced 
under an agreement with the Tobacco Association of 
Zambia, which is providing extension to the farmers. For 
groundnut production, links have been established with 
the Bulima Seed Growers' Association and local groundnut 
processing companies. Cheetah Zambia Ltd established a 
paprika outgrowers' scheme through a local trader 
involved with the project. 
The EU is also financing the "New Agricultural Product 
Development Fund" which is targeted at farmers (with a 
preference for smallholders), traders and processors. It 
has been proposed that an initial fund of 2 million ECU 
be dispersed in 10 loans of between 100,000-150,000 for 
the development of new projects presented by potential 
investors to the projects's steering committee. Some 
300,000 ECUs will be dispersed as research grants on new 
product development. 
According to Green (Green et al., op.cit, 1995 ) among 
the minor industrial crops considered in their review, 
paprika, turmeric and ginger, castor and bulk volume 
essential oils offer the best opportunities for 
successful diversification and potential for outgrower or 
smallholder development. The main constraint he 
identified was the lack of market knowledge among 
potential investors, not only for non-traditional crops 
but also for some more familiar crops with respect to 
trade potential within the region. For most potential 
investors, the "export market" means the international 
scene - especially Europe - and little awareness exists 
on the neighbouring market of South Africa. More 
information is required on the export potential of other 
agricultural commodities, especially to regional markets. 
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From the small amount of information available on the 
recent performance of outgrower programmes in Zambia it 
appears that at the institutional/operational level, the 
chief constraint to successful operation is the one 
identified earlier in this study, that of diversion of 
sales by smallholders. In the face of this, to maintain 
their operations investors need to expend considerable 
resources and effort in monitoring and supervision, an 
expense which may not be sustainable. 
Penny Evans is a commercial farmer in the Mazabuka area 
who has been operating her own contract farming scheme 
with local farmers for the last 10 years. She began by 
buying sunflower seed from about 50 local farmers for 
stock feed. The popularity of the scheme among the local 
farming community encouraged here to extend her 
operations to include cotton and maize. She now has 
2,941 farmers, whom she reaches through a network of 
agents (often village headmen) to whom she delivers 
inputs (fertiliser and seed) interest free in return for 
guaranteed crop purchase. She markets the maize through 
the Mazabuka Farmers Company. The sunflower is sold to a 
local oil processing company, High Protein Foods Ltd in 
Mazabouka, and the cotton to a Lonrho ginnery in Mombwa, 
about 230 km away. She has an arrangement with Lonrho 
for the supply of pesticides for cotton on credit to 
farmers. Repayment is deducted at source by Lonrho. 
The cotton producers in the scheme tend to be the better 
farmers as cotton requires a greater degree of technical 
input. Despite this, Mrs Evans has encountered problems 
in running her outgrower scheme. Poverty and 
desperation, following a succession of droughts in the 
region, has led many farmers to sell their crop through 
another member of the family to another buyer to avoid 
repaying her. There is growing competition in the area 
among buyers, particularly from Indian traders who offer 
immediate cash payment for cotton. Another problem is 
the diversion of fertiliser away from cotton production 
to food crops. 
High Protein Foods in Mazabuka operates its own outgrower 
scheme for sunflower. There are about 500 farmers in the 
scheme, cultivating an area of abut 2,500 ha. There are 
problems with repayment and some farmers sell the inputs 
they receive from the company rather than using them for 
growing the crop, but the company is committed to 
continuing the scheme as it believes that without it, 
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smallholders will not be able to supply the company with 
oilseeds at all. 
As mentioned above, a number of credit co-ordinators 
under the SGS/Cavmont Input Distribution including Bounty 
Farm Investments, BIMZI and Sable Transport, are 
operating outgrower schemes for the distribution of 
inputs. No evaluation of the performance of these 
schemes was possible for this study but one of these 
operators admitted that he had "burnt its fingers'' as 
drought led to a high level of default. George Lloyd of 
Bounty Farm Investments was by contrast very 
enthusiastic. He had arranged to supply his farmers with 
inputs in return for payment in kind at harvest, rather 
than on credit. He also operated a scheme which allowed 
farmers to choose when they wanted to be paid, allowing 
the company to take the grain on credit. The longer the 
farmer was prepared to wait, the higher the price paid as 
the grain appreciated in value. 
In Zambia most of Cheetah's contract farmers for paprika 
production are commercial farmers with access to 
irrigation. The company's principal concern is the 
enforcement of contracts. Whilst it remained the only 
buyer of paprika in the country, there were no 
opportunities for farmers to sell to other agents. 
However new buyers are now coming into the market, 
raising the possibility that their investment in growers 
will be undermined. 
Efforts by the company to target smallholders in Zambia 
have not been very successful. Smallholders are 
dispersed and are not organised, pushing up the cost of 
input delivery and extension. The company does not have 
the resources or expertise to organise farmers' groups. 
A culture of non payment of debt among smallholders 
compounds this problem (Stringfellow 1995). No written 
evaluation has been made of Cheetah's involvement wit the 
Smallholder Development Programme at Mpongwe, but the 
company did not consider it a success. Drought and 
default by the trader involved created problems and only 
US$ 5,000 of paprika was sold. The project cost US$25 
000. 
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Section Four: An agenda for further research 
1. The development of institutional innovations 
A review of secondary material and evidence from Malawi 
and Zambia indicates that one of the main problems facing 
the development of smallholder outgrower schemes in Sub 
Saharan Africa is the diversion of sales by producers to 
other buyers. 
One response to this problem, which has already been 
tried by Bounty Investments in Zambia, is for the company 
to restrict its services to input provision and 
marketing, not credit provision as well. Thus seed and 
fertiliser are made available at harvest, on a barter 
basis. Such arrangements can be advantageous to the 
farmer but may constrain his cash flow, forcing him to 
sell when the commodity price is low. A further issue is 
how the farmer will finance the initial investment in a 
new commodity if this is not provided by the company. It 
is likely that this approach will work better for crops 
which smallholders can produce with relatively little 
investment in inputs or extension, for example for castor 
seed. 
For crops where extension effort or expensive inputs are 
essential and have to be given in advance of harvest, 
companies need to develop mechanisms for obtaining some 
form of security from farmers if they are to provide 
these services on credit. Options might be a returnable 
deposit, a group guarantee or even a combination of the 
two, a group security fund. The feasibility of such 
arrangements should be explored in close consultation 
with the different parties involved. 
Organising outgrowers into groups would have other 
effects, as outlined in Section 2 (v) above. It would 
improve the farmers' bargaining position vis-a-vis the 
company, which might not appeal to the company itself, 
but such groups could potentially decrease the costs of 
extension to the company by bringing farmers together. 
Input distribution and marketing costs might also be 
reduced if the company passed the responsibility for the 
distribution of inputs and bulking of produce at the 
primary level to groups of farmers. 
Finally, the drawing up of a register of borrowers would 
allow companies to check the credit history of farmers 
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applying to be included in outgrower schemes. Such a 
register is already under development in Zambia within 
the EU funded Copperbelt Smallholder Project. 
2. Designing schemes which attract smallholder 
involvement 
As well as developing sustainable institutional 
arrangements, an investor needs to be sure that he is 
promoting a commodity compatible with existing patterns 
of smallholder production. Gender issues, the allocation 
of labour, including the seasonal distribution of 
agricultural tasks and out migration, all need to be 
understood. Project appraisal should therefore include a 
socio-economic component. 
Another issue is the high priority attached by many 
smallholders to the production of food over cash crops. 
The common diversion of fertiliser from cash crop 
production may require the investor to include provisions 
for the costs of providing inputs for food crops when 
assessing a project's financial feasibility. 
3. Protecting the interests of farmers and scheme 
organisers through education, organisation and 
arbitration 
Whilst contract farming and outgrower arrangements can 
introduce new economic opportunities for smallholders, 
they will be vulnerable to the exploitation that can 
result from a tied economic arrangement if isolated and 
with limited access to information. There is also a 
possibility, illustrated by examples in this report, that 
farmers will take a short term view of schemes in which 
they participate to the detriment of the scheme 
organisers and their own long term interests. This 
suggests a role for extension agencies, national farmers' 
organisations and other NGOs to provide farmers with 
information on contract farming arrangements, the rights 
and responsibilities of both parties involved, as well as 
commodity prices. 
This educational task would be much facilitated by 
organising farmers into groups or making use of groups 
that already exist. This would have other advantages as 
discussed above. 
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At a national level, the establishment of an independent 
information and arbitration service, representing 
farmers• and commercial interests, might play an 
important role in monitoring the performance of contract 
farming schemes, providing advice to those wishing to set 
up schemes and arbitrating in the case of disputes. The 
case for such a service, including the issue of how it 
would be funded, should be investigated in further 
research. 
4. The way forward 
(i) Collaborative work with private companies and 
farmers 
A number of recent or on-going schemes in Malawi and 
Zambia should be studied in order to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the constraints encountered and/or any 
successful approaches developed. Based on the findings 
of this work, we shall try to identify two or three 
companies which are interested in collaborative 11 action 
research 11 with NRI to develop and pilot new institutional 
arrangements. Participatory research with farmers will 
form an essential part of this process. 
Recent visits to Malawi and Zambia have already provided 
contacts to begin this work. In Malawi Press Agriculture 
Ltd has already offered its collaboration. Cheetah Ltd, 
in Malawi and Zambia, has expressed an interest. In 
Zambia there may be opportunities for follow-up work with 
some of the maize traders establishing outgrower schemes, 
or companies receiving support through the EU funded 
programmes. The status of the credit register will also 
be assessed. 
(ii) Developing a strategy for educating and organising 
farmers 
The key issues are what information should be targeted at 
farmers, how it should be channelled and by whom. As a 
first step NRI will need to identify a local counterpart 
organisation which has a network of farmers• groups (the 
National Farmers• Union or other national farmers• 
organisation (in Zambia the National Farmers Union has 
already expressed interest), the Ministry of Agriculture, 
an NGO) and an active interest in developing contract 
farming. This organisation will be able to use its local 
knowledge to provide direction and guidance and the 
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direct access to farmers which will be required if the 
research is to be a success. The case for a national 
information and arbitration service will also be examined 
during the course of this research. 
(iii) The next step 
Contacts will be followed up in Zambia and Malawi with a 
view to carrying out a three week mission to Zambia in 
March and, subject to approval, to Malawi in June. 
During the visits, efforts will be made to identify a 
local counterpart organisation with which to work. 
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